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Abstract
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1 Introduction
As network industries continue to open up to competition around the world, the terms under
which various networks interconnect have increasingly become the subject of public and regulatory
debate. Interconnections are particularly important in the telecommunications industry where
competition has developed faster than in other network industries. In the U.S., current regulation
of interconnection among telecommunication carriers may be classi…ed into interconnections among
competing local exchange carriers (LECs) and interconnections between LECs and Interexchange
carriers (IXCs). The …rst type of interconnections is, pursuant to the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, mandatory, and requires LECs to negotiate reciprocal compensation rates for calls made
by subscribers of one LEC to subscribers of another LEC. The second type of interconnections
is regulated pursuant to a series of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) orders and rules.
These orders and rules mandate interconnection between LECs and IXCs while placing a cap on the
interconnection fees that LECs charge IXCs. Strict regulation of access to a network’s subscriber
base also characterizes other network industries such as cable TV and electricity.1
The idea behind the reforms in network industries was to replace regulation with compe-
tition. In the case of telecommunications, U.S. courts and the FCC have stressed ”Congress’s
directive that the [FCC] replace regulation with competition to the greatest extent possible con-
sistent with the public interest ... competitive markets are far better than regulatory agencies at
allocating resources and services e¢ciently for the maximum bene…t of consumers.”2 At the same
time, regulators remain concerned that competitive forces would not su¢ce to restrain the rates
and conditions that networks set for granting other networks access to their customer base.
This paper examines a simple and extremely e¤ective market force that could justify (either
partial or complete) deregulation of interconnections: The ability of one network, seeking access
to another network’s customer base, to transit tra¢c to and from the other network via a third
1For example, the FCC has been considering requiring cable operators to furnish nondiscriminatory cable trans-
mission capacity to una¢liated Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (See In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access
to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, FCC Record, vol. 17, p. 4798, 7 (Declaratory Ruling and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking) (2002)). Similarly, in the course of restructuring the U.S. electricity markets, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reinforced open access and unbundling requirements to insure undiscrimi-
natory access to public utilities’ transmission facilities by independent retailers and generators of electricity. For a
recent discussion of such regulation, see http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/pr-current/07-23-03-interconnect1.pdf.
2See Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Federal Communications Commission, 153 F.3d 523, 547, 549 (8th
Cir. 1998).
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network. For example, when two LECs are interconnected, an IXC can transit long-distance calls
to and from the subscribers of one LEC via the other LEC’s network. Likewise, an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) can reach the customer base of one LEC or cable carrier via another LEC or cable
carrier with which the …rst carrier is interconnected.3
Our model focuses on an IXC that faces two interconnected LECs and needs to pay them
interconnection fees for long-distance calls that either originate or terminate at their networks.
Contrary to the current regime, in which interconnection between LECs and IXCs is heavily reg-
ulated, interconnection between the LECs and the IXC in our model is completely deregulated.
This is because we are interested in …nding out whether competitive transit can replace regulation.
An important feature of the model is that the IXC need not interconnect directly with both LECs;
instead it can interconnect with a single LEC and transit calls to and from the other LEC via the
…rst LEC. Anticipating their dealings with the IXC, the LECs negotiate either a positive or a
negative reciprocal access fee for transited tra¢c that ‡ows between their networks so as to boost
their access revenue from dealing with the IXC.4 We therefore examine how, if at all, the reciprocal
access fee that the two LECs negotiate should be regulated in order to restrain the interconnection
fees that LECs charge the IXC with no need for further regulatory intervention.
We show that if the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance tra¢c are equal, both
LECs will voluntarily interconnect with the IXC at no charge, irrespective of the value of the
reciprocal access fee that the LECs have negotiated before dealing with the IXC. Interestingly,
this outcome is equivalent to that under mandatory interconnection with a ”bill and keep” regime
which was recently proposed by the FCC. Under this regime, all LEC interconnection charges are
3The practice of sending tra¢c to one network via another network is very common and is often referred to as
”least cost routing.” Transit arrangements are common between Internet backbones: when backbone A purchases
transit access from backbone B, it typically gains access to all backbones interconnected with backbone B (see Crémer,
Rey, and Tirole, 2000, and Kende 2000). Transit arrangements are also common in international telecommunication.
Two countries can interconnect by transiting calls through a third country (see, e.g., FCC Releases 1996 International
Tra¢c Data, 1998 FCC LEXIS 363, *12-13, 1998). Transit also exists in local telecommunication markets (see, e.g.,
In Re Developing a Uni…ed Intercarrier Compansation Regime, CC Docket No. 01-92, 2001 FCC LEXIS 2339 (Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 2001) albeit it is not common in the context of interconnection with IXCs, presumably
because direct interconnection between LECs and IXCs is mandated under regulated rates. Transit currently exists
in cases where a network, typically a cellular or paging network, does not have direct interconnection with a certain
LEC, see e.g., Texcom, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., FCC Record, vol. 17, p. 6275 (2002) (discussing a dispute between
a cellular network and a LEC that transited calls ‡owing between the competing LEC and the cellular network).
4Troughtout the paper we refer to the price that the LECs pay one another for transited long-distance tra¢c as
”access fee” and refer to the prices that the IXC pays the two LECs as ”interconnection fees.”
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regulated down to zero, unless the interconnecting networks agree otherwise.5 Transit has the
obvious advantage that it leads to voluntary interconnection at no charge without a need for any
regulatory intervention.
In contrast, when the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance tra¢c are unequal,
the two LECs would strategically set the reciprocal access fee for transited long-distance tra¢c so
as to force the IXC to o¤er them higher interconnection fees. This strategic behavior on the LECs’
part may force the IXC to pay the two LECs excessively high interconnection fees. Nonetheless,
we show that it is still possible to achieve the same outcome as in a ”bill and keep” regime by
mandating that the LECs will transit long-distance calls to one another at no charge. Given this
requirement, the two LECs will voluntarily agree to interconnect with the IXC at no charge without
a need for directly regulating their interconnection with the IXC. We also show that when the IXC
can price discriminate between direct and transited long-distance calls (and has all the bargaining
power vis-a-vis the two LECs) then the IXC will be able to interconnect with both LECs at cost
without a need for any type of regulation.
The literature on access pricing is relatively new but is rapidly growing (see Armstrong
2002 for a comprehensive literature survey). Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996a, 1996b)
examine competition between interconnected networks and …nd that a dominant network can price
squeeze an entrant by setting a higher price for o¤-net calls than for on-net calls. But, when
access charges must be reciprocal, the price di¤erence between on-net and o¤-net calls disappears
and monopoly becomes less likely. Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) show
that whenever networks compete with one another by setting uniform per-call prices, an above-cost
reciprocal access fee can be used as an instrument of tacit collusion. The reason for this is that an
above-cost access fee induces each network to raise its per-call price above its rivals’ price in order
to induce its subscribers to make fewer o¤-net calls than they receive and thereby ensure that the
network enjoys an access surplus. La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a,b) show that this conclusion
no longer holds when networks can either use nonlinear prices and/or price discriminate between
on-net and o¤-net calls. With nonlinear prices, networks can compete for market share by lowering
their …xed fees without having to lower their usage fees and thereby increasing their access de…cit.
Hence there is no need to use the reciprocal access fee as a way to guarantee high retail prices.
Under price discrimination, high access fees may intensify retail price competition because each
5For details, see Intercarrier Compensation Proposal FCC Record Vol. 16, p. 9610, (2001). The FCC’s Proposal
is based mainly on two FCC working papers: Atkinson and Barnekov (2000) and DeGraba (2002).
4
network has a stronger incentive to build market share in order to save on the volume of (costly)
o¤-net calls.6 Carter and Wright (2003) extend the La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a, 1998b) model
and consider the case of asymmetric networks. They show that under two-part tari¤s, the larger
network will always prefer a reciprocal access fee equal to cost, while the smaller network may
prefer an above-cost reciprocal access fee for moderate levels of asymmetry. Valletti and Cambini
(2003) endogenize the potential asymmetry between the networks by introducing a preliminary
stage in which the networks invest in their quality of service. Since in their model subscribers
make more calls when the network’s quality is higher, an above-cost reciprocal access fee will give
the higher quality network an access de…cit vis-a-vis the lower quality network. As a result, the
networks prefer to set an above-cost access fee in order to soften the competition between them
in the investment stage. Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2002) extend the La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole
(1998a,b) framework to consider heterogeneous consumers. Peitz (2003) shows that regulating
access prices to ensure that only an entrant enjoys an access markup enhances the likelihood of
entry and, given entry, makes competition between the entrant and incumbent more intense.
None of these papers, however, studied the interaction between two interconnected networks
and a third network which is the main focus of our paper. Moreover, in our paper, the reciprocal
access fee does not a¤ect competition between the interconnected networks but rather a¤ects their
interaction with a third network that seeks access to their subscribers. The closest papers to ours
are Carter and Wright (1999) and Wright (2002). They consider two networks that compete for
customers and set access fees that a third network must pay them for access. They show that when
the competing networks set unilateral access fees and use two-part retail tari¤s, they both wish to
raise their access fees and use the resulting revenue as a way to subsidize their …xed retail charges
in an attempt to attract more subscribers and boost their respective market share. This will lead
to escalation of the unilateral access fees. This escalation can be mitigated or even completely
eliminated if the two networks must agree on a common access fee. These papers, however, do not
consider the possibility of competitive transit, which is the main focus of our paper. Finally, Gilo
(2003) discusses the legal and regulatory implications of relying on transit as a market force that
could restrain access charges.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework. Section 3
derives the interconnection fees that the IXC would o¤er and characterizes the reciprocal access
6Gans and King (2001) and Berger (2002) show that with price discrimination between on-net and o¤-net calls,
low, rather than high, interconnect fees can be used to soften price competition among networks.
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fee that the two LECs would choose in anticipation of the IXC’s o¤er. Access price discrimination
is examined in Section 4 and the case in which the LECs o¤er interconnection fees to the IXC is
examined in Section 5. Concluding remarks appear in Section 6.
2 The model
Consider two interconnected networks facing a third network that seeks access to their customer
base. For the sake of concreteness, we refer to the two interconnected networks as Local Exchange
Carriers (LECs) and to the third network as an Interexchange Carrier (IXC) although our analysis
may also apply to other cases. For instance, the third network could be an ISP or an internet
backbone seeking access to the LECs’ or to cable carriers’ customer base, or an electricity generator
or retailer seeking access to the transmission grids of interconnected electric utilities.
In order to focus on the interaction between the two LECs and the IXC, we abstract from
competition in the local exchange market and consider the following three-stage game: In the
…rst stage, the two LECs negotiate a reciprocal per-call access fee a for transited tra¢c that ‡ows
between their networks.7 The access fee a is paid by the sending network to the receiving network.
In the second stage, the IXC o¤ers the two LECs contracts, (p1; bp1) and (p2; bp2), where p1 and p2
are the per-call interconnection fees that the IXC will pay the two LECs for inbound and outbound
long-distance calls if both LECs interconnect with the IXC, and bpi is the per-call interconnection
fee for inbound and outbound calls that the IXC will pay LEC i = 1; 2 if only LEC i interconnects
with the IXC. In the third and last stage of the game, the two LECs simultaneously decide whether
to accept or reject the IXC’s o¤er. If LEC j rejects the IXC’s o¤er while LEC i accepts it, long-
distance calls to and from LEC j’s customers will be transited via LEC i’s network.8 If both LECs
reject the IXC’s o¤ers, the customers of the two LECs cannot receive or make long-distance calls
(in equilibrium of course this is never the case).
Let Q1 and Q2 be the volumes of inbound long-distance calls that customers of LECs 1 and
2 receive and mQ1 and mQ2 the corresponding volumes of outbound long-distance calls. That
7In Michigan Bell Telephone Company v. Chappelle, 222 F. Supp. 2d 905, 917-918 (2002), the federal district
court held that federal law does not deal with the issue of access that a LEC provides for transited calls and that
this issue is left to the state law governing the operations of the LEC. Hence, the access fee a need not be equal to
the access fee that the LECs set for local calls made between their respective customers.
8For call termination, the IXC can simply route the calls to LEC j via LEC i’s network. In the case of call
origination, the IXC can ask its LEC j’s customers to dial up a special access code that routes their outbound calls
via LEC i’s network.
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is, we assume that there is a constant ratio, m ¸ 0, between outbound and inbound long-distance
calls and that this ratio is the same for both LECs. Although in general m is strictly positive,
there are important cases in which m = 0 (i.e., no outbound tra¢c). Examples for such ”one-
way-access” situations include ISPs seeking access to LECs’ or cable carriers customers base and
electricity generators or retailers seeking access to electric utilities’ transmission grids. To simplify
matters, we assume that Q1 and Q2 are independent of the interconnection fees that the IXC pays
the two LECs. Admittedly, this assumption is restrictive and should be relaxed in future research.
However, at least in the case of the U.S., this assumption can be partly justi…ed on the grounds
that IXCs are required by the FCC to average their costs across all of their subscribers regardless
of the LEC they subscribe to.9 Consequently, the interconnection fees of one LEC, especially if
it is relatively small, will have only a small impact on the retail long-distance tari¤s and hence on
the volume of long-distance tra¢c. Without a loss of generality, we will assume that Q1 ¸ Q2:
the volume of long-distance calls is greater in LEC 1 than in LEC 2. Accordingly, we will often
refer to LEC 1 as the ”big LEC” and LEC 2 as the ”small LEC.”
The LECs incur per-call costs c for trunk transmission, co for call origination, and ct for call
termination. Hence, when a LEC is directly interconnected with the IXC, the costs of originating
and terminating long-distance calls, respectively, are c+ co and c+ ct. When long-distance calls
are transited, there is an additional trunk transmission cost c since the transited calls are routed
through the networks of both LECs. Hence, transit is ine¢cient. Yet, as we shall see, transit
may arise if the access fee, a, that the LECs negotiate for transited tra¢c that ‡ows between their
networks is relatively high.
We now turn to the LECs’ pro…ts. The pro…t of LEC i when both LECs are interconnected
with the IXC is
¼i(Y; Y ) = Qi(pi ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi(pi ¡ c¡ co): (1)
The …rst term represents LEC i’s pro…t on inbound long-distance calls while the second term
represents its pro…t on outbound calls. In both cases, LEC i collects from the IXC per-call
interconnection fee, pi; and bears the associated costs.
9See In re Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace Implementation of Section
254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Docket No. 96-61, FCC Rcd., vol. 11, p. 9564 (Report
and Order) (1996).
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If LEC i interconnects with the IXC while LEC j does not, then LEC i’s pro…t is
¼i(Y;N) = Qi(bpi ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi(bpi ¡ c¡ co) +Qj(bpi ¡ a¡ c) +mQj(bpi + a¡ c): (2)
In the opposite case where only LEC j interconnects with the IXC, LEC i’s pro…t is
¼i(N;Y ) = Qi(a¡ c¡ ct)¡mQi(a+ c+ co): (3)
The …rst two terms in ¼i(Y;N) represent LEC i’s pro…t on long-distance calls that terminate and
originate at its own network, while the last two terms represent LEC i’s pro…t on calls that are
transited to and from LEC j’s network. LEC i then pays LEC j a per-call access fee a on inbound
calls that terminate at LEC j’s network but receives from LEC j a per-call access fee a on outbound
calls that originate at LEC j’s network. ¼i(N;Y ) has a corresponding interpretation.
3 Equilibrium
To characterize the (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the three-stage game described in the previous
section, we …rst solve the third stage of the game in which the two LECs simultaneously decide
whether or not to accept the IXC’s o¤er. We then turn to the second stage of the game in which
the IXC makes o¤ers to the two LECs in anticipation of their responses in the third stage. Finally
we consider the …rst stage of the game in which the two LECs determine their reciprocal access fee,
a, for transited tra¢c.
3.1 The interconnection fees
Given the IXC’s o¤ers, (p1; bp1) and (p2; bp2), the payo¤ matrix in the third stage of the game is
given by
LEC 2
Accept Reject
LEC 1 Accept ¼1(Y; Y ); ¼2(Y; Y ) ¼1(Y;N); ¼2(N;Y )
Reject ¼1(N;Y ); ¼2(Y;N) 0; 0
If the IXC wishes to interconnect with both LECs, it must induce a unique Nash equilibrium
at (Accept, Accept). To this end, the IXC’s o¤ers (p1; bp1) and (p2; bp2)must satisfy the conditions (i)
¼1(Y; Y ) ¸ ¼1(N;Y ), (ii) ¼2(Y; Y ) ¸ ¼2(N;Y ), and either (iii) ¼1(Y;N) > 0; or (iv) ¼2(Y;N) > 0
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(we assume that when indi¤erent, LECs accept the IXC’s o¤er). Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure
that (Accept, Accept) is a Nash equilibrium, while conditions (iii) and (iv) ensure that (Reject,
Reject) is not a Nash equilibrium. Conditions (i) and (ii) require that
pi ¸
µ
1¡m
1 +m
¶
a; i = 1; 2; (4)
while conditions (iii) and (iv) require that bp1 and bp2 are su¢ciently large.
On the other hand, if the IXC wishes to interconnect exclusively with LEC 1, then it must
induce a unique Nash equilibrium at (Accept, Reject). Therefore, (p1; bp1) and (p2; bp2) must be
such that (i) ¼2(Y; Y ) < ¼2(N;Y ), (ii) ¼1(Y;N) ¸ 0, and either (iii) ¼1(Y; Y ) ¸ ¼1(N;Y ), or (iv)
¼2(Y;N) < 0. Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that (Accept, Reject) is a Nash equilibrium, while
either conditions (iii) or (iv) ensures that (Reject, Accept) is not a Nash equilibrium. Condition (i)
and (iii) are equivalent to p2 <
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a < p1, condition (iv) requires that bp2 would be su¢ciently
small (say 0), and condition (ii) is equivalent to
bp1 ¸ bp¤1 ´ c+ °K + (1¡ °)µ1¡m1 +m
¶
a; (5)
where K ´ ct+mco1+m is a weighted average of the cost of call origination, co and call termination, ct,
and ° ´ Q1Q1+Q2 is the share of long-distance calls that originate and terminate at LEC 1’s network.
The fee bp¤1 is equal to the average cost of LEC 1 when it interconnects exclusively with the IXC.
These average costs consist of the transmission cost, c, plus a weighted average of K (the cost of
originating and terminating calls) and a (the cost of access), with the weights being equal to the
proportion of calls that terminate in LEC 1’s own network and the proportion of calls that are
transited to LEC 2’s network.
Analogously, to interconnect exclusively with LEC 2, the IXC’s o¤er must be such that
p1 <
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a < p2, bp1 should be su¢ciently small (say 0), and bp2 should be such that
bp2 ¸ bp¤2 ´ c+ (1¡ °)K + °µ1¡m1 +m
¶
a; (6)
where bp¤2 is the average cost of LEC 2 when it interconnects exclusively with the IXC.
Using (4)-(6) we establish the following result:
Proposition 1: (The interconnection fees) The IXC will interconnect with both LECs and will
pay them a per-call fee
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a if µ
1¡m
1 +m
¶
a · K + c
°
:
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Otherwise, the IXC will interconnect exclusively with LEC 1 and will pay it a per-call fee bp¤1 <³
1¡m
1+m
´
a.
Proof: Since the IXC wishes to minimizes its per-call access charges, it will o¤er
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a if it
wishes to interconnect with both LECs and bp¤i if it wishes to interconnect exclusively with LEC i.
Using (5) and (6),
bp¤1 ¡ bp¤2 = (2° ¡ 1)·K ¡µ1¡m1 +m
¶
a
¸
:
Since Q1 ¸ Q2, ° ´ Q1Q1+Q2 ¸ 12 . Hence, bp¤1 ¸ bp¤2 if K ¸ ³1¡m1+m´a and bp¤1 < bp¤2 otherwise. There
are now two possibilities:
(i) If K ¸
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a, then the IXC will either interconnect with both LECs or will interconnect
exclusively with LEC 2. But since K ¸
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a;
bp¤2 ¡µ1¡m1 +m
¶
a = c+ (1¡ °)
·
K ¡
µ
1¡m
1 +m
¶
a
¸
¸ 0;
so the IXC will interconnect with both LECs and will pay them
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a.
(ii) If K <
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a, then the IXC will either interconnect with both LECs or will interconnect
exclusively with LEC 1. Noting that
bp¤1 ¡µ1¡m1 +m
¶
a = c+ °
·
K ¡
µ
1¡m
1 +m
¶
a
¸
;
the IXC will either interconnect with both LECs and will pay them
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a if
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a · K + c°
but will interconnect exclusively with LEC 1 and will pay it bp¤1 if ³1¡m1+m´a > K + c° . ¥
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. To interconnect with both LECs, the IXC
needs to o¤er the two LECs an interconnection fee
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a since this is the net per-call access
revenue that each LEC can receive by rejecting the IXC’s o¤er and transiting all inbound and
outbound long-distance calls via the rival LEC’s network.10 On the other hand, if the IXC wishes
to interconnect exclusively with LEC i, then rejecting the IXC’s o¤er means that neither LEC will
be interconnected with the IXC. Hence, to induce LEC i to agree to an exclusive interconnection,
10Note that
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a could be negative in which case the LECs pay the IXC for interconnection rather than vice
versa.
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a will be negative if either m > 1 (more outbound than inbound long-distance calls) and a > 0, or
when m < 1 (more inbound than outbound long-distance calls) and a < 0.
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the IXC must o¤er LEC i an interconnection fee bp¤i equal to LEC i’s average cost and ensures that
the LEC just breaks even on long-distance calls. When
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a is small (or even negative), it
is cheaper to interconnect with both LECs than interconnect exclusively with one of them. But
since bp¤1 and bp¤2 increase with ³1¡m1+m´a at a rate of less than 1, it is clear that as ³1¡m1+m´a increases,
there eventually exists a critical value of
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a above which an exclusive interconnection with
one LEC is cheaper than interconnection with both LECs. Noting that since ° ¸ 12 ,
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a
receives a smaller weight in bp¤1 than in bp¤2 (the volume of transit calls is smaller when the large LEC
has to transit long-distance calls to the small LEC than vice versa), it follows that when
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a
is relatively large, it is cheaper for the IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC 1.
Proposition 1 has at least two important implications. First, transit is ine¢cient since each
transited call is transmitted through the networks of both LECs and hence involves an additional
trunk transmission cost of c. Hence,
Corollary 1: (E¢ciency) The equilibrium is ex post e¢cient only when
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a · K + c° .
Otherwise, long-distance calls to and from LEC 2’s customers are ine¢ciently transited via LEC
1’s network.
Second, as mentioned in the Introduction, the FCC has recently proposed a new ”bill and
keep” regime according to which all LECs’ interconnection charges will be regulated to 0 unless
the interconnecting networks agree otherwise. Proposition 1 shows that whenever m = 1 (the
volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance calls are equal), p¤1 = p¤2 = 0. That is, competitive
transit induces the LEC to interconnect with the IXC at no charge without any need for regulatory
intervention. Intuitively, if LEC i refuses to interconnect with the IXC, then its long-distance calls
are transited via LEC j’s network. But since m = 1, the resulting access revenue (on inbound calls
if a > 0 and outbound calls if a < 0) is just equal to the access expenditure (on outbound calls if
a > 0 and inbound calls if a < 0). That is, LEC i just breaks even on long-distance calls if it does
not interconnect with the IXC. Consequently, the IXC can induce both LECs to interconnect with
it at 0 interconnection fee.
By contrast, when the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance calls are unequal
(i.e.,m 6= 1), Proposition 1 shows that in general, the IXC will have to pay the LECs interconnection
fees that are di¤erent than 0. However, if the reciprocal access fee, a; is regulated to 0, then the
two LECs would be willing to interconnect with the IXC at no charge. Again, the intuition for this
is that by refusing to interconnect with the IXC, the net income of each LEC from long-distance
11
calls (that are now transited through the network of the rival LEC) is 0. Once again, it is possible
to replicate the outcome of a “bill and keep outcome” regime for LEC-IXC interconnection without
having to directly regulate the interconnection fees that the LECs charge the IXC.
Corollary 2: (Replicating a “bill and keep outcome” regime with competitive transit) The IXC will
interconnect with both LECs at 0 fees if either the volumes of inbound and outbound long-distance
calls are equal (i.e., m = 1) or if the reciprocal access fee that the LECs charge one another, a, is
equal to 0:
In practice, direct regulation of LEC-IXC interconnection should address not only the inter-
connection fees that IXCs pay the LECs, but also an array of additional factors, such as the quality
of interconnection, technical standards, and repair services (see Gilo 2003 for details). Corollary 2
suggests that in order to achieve a “bill and keep outcome” there is no need to regulate LEC-IXC
interconnection: instead, it is enough to add an additional provision to the regulation of LEC-LEC
interconnections (which is regulated anyway for various reasons) stating that LECs should transit
long-distance calls to one another at no charge.11 Clearly then, competitive transit can lower the
regulatory burden needed to enforce ”bill and keep” outcomes.
3.2 The choice of the reciprocal access fee
In this subsection we turn to the …rst stage of the game in which the two LECs negotiate their
reciprocal access fee, a. Our main purpose is to examine the preferences of the two LECs over a
- we will not postulate a particular bargaining game and attempt to solve for a speci…c value of a.
Using equation (1) and Proposition 1, the pro…ts of the two LECs, as functions of a, are
¼1(a) =
8<: ¼1(N;Y ); if
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a · K + c° ;
0; otherwise,
(7)
and
¼2(a) = ¼2(N;Y ): (8)
11 In fact, the rates that incumbent LECs charge new LECs for transited calls are typically regulated anyway. See,
e.g., US West Communications v. TCG Seattle,1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22271, at p. 9-10; In Re Petition of WorldCom,
Inc. Pursuant to Section 252(e)(5) of the Communications Act for Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the Virginia
State Corporation Commission Regarding Interconnection Disputes with Verizon Virginia Inc., CC Docket No. 00-
218, 2003 FCC LEXIS 6879, at p. 76; Texcom, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., FCC Record, vol 17 p. 6275 (2002); and
Michigan Bell Telephone Compnany v. Chapelle, 222 F. Supp. 2d 905 (2002).
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With equations (7) and (8) in place, we are ready to examine the preferences of the two
LECs over the reciprocal access fee, a.
Proposition 2: (The choice of the reciprocal access fee)
² If m = 1, the two LECs are indi¤erent to the value of the reciprocal access fee, a.
² If m 6= 1, the big LEC, LEC 1 will prefer to set a such that
a =
µ
1 +m
1¡m
¶µ
K +
c
°
¶
;
which in turn induces the IXC to interconnect with both LECs at K + c=°. By contrast,
the small LEC, LEC 2, will prefer to set a as negative as possible if m > 1 and as large as
possible if m < 1.
² The equilibrium is e¢cient only if jaj ·
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
.
When the IXC interconnects with both LECs, it o¤ers them a per-call interconnection fee³
1¡m
1+m
´
a to ensure that the pro…t of each LEC i is just equal to ¼i(N;Y ) which is LEC i’s pro…t
from rejecting the IXC’s o¤er and transiting all inbound and outbound long-distance calls via LEC
j’s network. As (3) shows, ¼i(N;Y ) is independent of a whenm = 1, implying that in this case the
LECs are indi¤erent to the value of a. When m > 1 (m < 1), ¼i(N;Y ) is decreasing (increasing)
with a since the LEC’s total expenditure on outbound calls is larger (smaller) than its total revenue
from inbound calls. Hence, the two LECs wish to set a negative (positive) a to boost their pro…ts
from long-distance tra¢c. But, as jaj >
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
, the IXC o¤ers interconnection fees such
that LEC 2 refuses to interconnect with the IXC. In this case, if LEC 1 rejects the IXC’s o¤er as
well, no LEC will interconnect with the IXC and LEC 1’s pro…t will be 0. The IXC can therefore
o¤er LEC 1 a fee bp¤1 that leaves LEC 1 with a 0 pro…t. Obviously then, LEC 1 does not want jaj
to exceed
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
. On the other hand, LEC 2 prefers to raise jaj as much as possible.12
Interestingly, Carter and Wright (2003) also …nd that a large network will prefer a low reciprocal
access fee while the smaller network may prefer a high reciprocal access fee. Their model however
only considers tra¢c between the two networks: there are no calls to and from a third network as
in our model.
12Of course, if the demand for long-distance calls is price elastic, then an increase in jaj (that raises the intercon-
nection fees that the IXC pays the two LECs), will lead to higher retail prices for long-distnace calls and hence will
depress the demand for long-distance calls. Hence, even LEC 2 will wish to raise jaj only up to a certain point.
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Proposition 2 has several interesting implications. First, at LEC 1’s ideal a, the IXC
interconnects with both LECs and pays them an interconnection fee of K + c° per-call. This fee
decreases with ° which is the share of long-distance tra¢c that originates and terminates at the
big LEC, LEC 1. To the extent that a low ideal a for LEC 1 will translate to a low a, we can draw
the following conclusion:
Corollary 3: (The e¤ect of the shares of the two LECs in the long-distance tra¢c) The IXC is
better-o¤ as the gap between the sizes of the two LECs grows.
Second, up to now we have implicitly assumed that transit is mandatory. A natural question
to ask is what happens if the two LECs can refuse to transit calls to one another? To address this
question, note that absent transit, the IXC needs to interconnect with both LECs so the pro…t of
each LEC i is given by ¼i(Y; Y ) (see equation (1)). To induce LEC i to interconnect, the IXC
needs to o¤er LEC i an interconnection fee such that ¼i(Y; Y ) ¸ 0. The lowest fee that ensures
LEC i a nonnegative pro…t is K + c. With transit, the LECs lose money on long-distance calls if
m = 1 since by Proposition 1, the IXC interconnects with both LECs at no charge. Hence, the
two LECs are better-o¤ committing not to transit long-distance calls to one another. In contrast,
if m 6= 1, then the two LECs make a positive pro…t on long-distance calls if they agree to transit
calls and set jaj =
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
. This reciprocal access fee induces the IXC to o¤er both LECs
an interconnection fee of K + c° which, given that ° < 1, exceeds the interconnection fee absent
transit, K + c. Consequently, both LECs can bene…t from transit.
Moreover, unless m = 1, the small LEC, LEC 2, would like to raise jaj as much as possible,
whereas the big LEC, LEC 1, would like to raise jaj only up to
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
. But, if transit is
not mandatory (each LEC can refuse to transit calls to the rival LEC), then LEC 1 can threaten
LEC 2 that if jaj >
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
, LEC 1 will refuse to transit long-distance calls to LEC 2. This
threat is credible since whenever jaj >
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
, the IXC o¤ers LEC 1 an interconnection feebp¤1 such that LEC 1 just breaks even on long-distance calls and hence gains nothing from transiting
calls to LEC 2. In contrast, if transit is mandatory, then (at least in principle) LEC 2 might be
able to force LEC 1 to agree to set jaj above
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
. Hence,
Corollary 4: (Voluntary transit)
² If m = 1 then the LECs are better-o¤ committing not to transit long-distance calls to one
another.
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² If m 6= 1, then both LECs can bene…t from agreeing to transit long-distance calls to one
another. Moreover, allowing LEC 1 to refuse to transit long-distance calls to and from LEC
2 enables LEC 1 to force LEC 2 to agree to set the access fee, a, equal to
³
1+m
1¡m
´³
K + c°
´
which is LEC 1’s ideal access fee when m 6= 1.
To the extent that it is socially desirable to keep jaj (and thereby the interconnection
fees) low, Corollary 4 suggests that it may be a poor idea to force the LECs to transit long-
distance calls to each other: under mandatory transit, the reciprocal access fee may be set such
that jaj >
¯¯¯
1+m
1¡m
¯¯¯ ³
K + c°
´
; in which case the IXC will ine¢ciently interconnect exclusively with
LEC 1: By contrast, when LEC 1’s can refuse to transit long-distance calls to LEC 2, a is at most
equal to
³
1+m
1¡m
´³
K + c°
´
and the IXC interconnects with both LECs.
4 Access price discrimination
In this section we consider the case in which the IXC can o¤er the LECs interconnection fees that
depend on whether calls originate or terminate at a LEC’s network or are transited to and from
the rival LEC. That is, we consider the case where the IXC can price discriminate between calls
depending on their destination. Speci…cally, let p11 and p22 be the interconnection fees that the
IXC o¤ers the two LECs for calls that originate or terminate at their own networks, and pij be the
interconnection fee that the IXC o¤ers LEC i for calls that originate or terminate at LEC j and
are transited via LEC i’s network. Let bpii and bp be the corresponding interconnection fees when
only LEC i accepts the IXC’s o¤er.
Proposition 3: (Price discrimination). Suppose that the IXC can price discriminate between long-
distance calls that terminate in a LEC’s network and calls that are transited to the rival LEC. Then,
the two LECs will set a reciprocal access fee a =
³
1+m
1¡m
´
(K + c) and the IXC will interconnect with
both LECs and will pay each LEC an interconnection fee K + c per-call.
Proof: We begin by considering the IXC’s o¤er to the two LECs given the reciprocal access fee a
that the two LECs have negotiated in stage 1. If
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a < K + c, the IXC o¤ers p11 = p22 =³
1¡m
1+m
´
a, bp11 = bp22 = K + c, and bp12 = bp21 = ³1¡m1+m´ a+ c. If both LECs accept the o¤er, then
the pro…t of LEC i is Qi(pii ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi(pii ¡ c¡ co). If LEC i rejects the o¤er, then LEC j
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will surely accept it since with bpjj = K + c and bpji = ³1¡m1+m´ a+ c, LEC j’s pro…t is
Qj(K ¡ ct) +mQj(K ¡ co) +Qi
µµ
1¡m
1 +m
¶
a¡ a
¶
+mQi
µµ
1¡m
1 +m
¶
a+ a
¶
= 0;
exactly as in the case where LEC j rejects the IXC’s o¤er as well (in which case no LEC is
interconnected with the IXC); we assume that when indi¤erent, a LEC accepts the IXC’s o¤er.
Since LEC j accepts the IXC’s o¤er, LEC i will receive its long-distance calls via LEC j’s network
and its pro…t is given by ¼i(N;Y ) (see equation (3)). Equating Qi(pii¡ c¡ ct)+mQi(pii¡ c¡ co)
and ¼i(N;Y ) reveals that pii =
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a is the minimal interconnection fee that will induce both
LECs to accept the IXC’s o¤er.
If
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a ¸ K + c, then the IXC would concede rents to the LECs if it were to make
the above o¤ers. Therefore, the IXC can modify its o¤er by setting p11 = p22 = K + c andbp12 = bp21 =1. Now, if a LEC refuses to interconnect with the IXC, its pro…t will be 0 since withbp12 = bp21 = 1, the IXC will never transit calls to this LEC via the rival LEC’s network. With
p11 = p22 = K + c, both LECs will accept the IXC’s o¤er since at these interconnection fees, they
both break even on long-distance calls.
Given the IXC’s o¤er, the LECs lose money on long-distance calls if
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a < K + c and
break even otherwise. Hence the two LECs will set
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a = K+c in the …rst stage of the game,
or a =
³
1+m
1¡m
´
(K + c). In the resulting equilibrium, the IXC will interconnect with both LECs
and will pay an interconnection fee K + c on each call. ¥
Proposition 3 shows that under access price discrimination, the interconnection fees that
the IXC pays the two LECs are equal to those that would obtain in the absence of transit. The
idea behind this result is as follows. To induce a LEC to interconnect with the IXC at minimal
fees, the IXC must o¤er each LEC i an interconnection fee that leaves LEC i as well o¤ as in the
case where it rejects the IXC’s o¤er. If
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a < K + c; LEC i would lose money by refusing to
interconnect with the IXC and transiting all long-distance calls via LEC j’s network. The minimal
interconnection fee that the IXC needs to o¤er LEC i in this case is
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a, which by design,
leaves LEC i with a loss on each long-distance call. However when
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a ¸ K + c, transiting
long-distance calls via LEC j’s network is not a losing proposition anymore for LEC i. Hence, if
transit is an option, the IXC must o¤er each LEC i an interconnection fee that leaves the LEC a
positive rent. But, when the IXC can price discriminate between direct and transited long-distance
calls, it can credibly commit not to send or receive such calls by raising the interconnection fee on
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transited calls to a prohibitive level.13 As a result, a LEC can o¤er its customers access to long-
distance calls only if it interconnects directly with the IXC: transit is not a viable option anymore.
Since the IXC can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the two LECs, it can o¤er them interconnection
fees that just cover their costs but leave them no rent. A similar strategy is impossible in the no
discrimination case since the IXC must set the same interconnection fee for direct and transited
long-distance calls and therefore has no way of credibly committing to block transited calls. The
two LECs can therefore take advantage of that and set up a high access price a that forces the IXC
to o¤er them higher interconnection fees.
By revealed preferences, it is not surprising that the ability to price discriminate between
direct and transited calls bene…ts the IXC. Proposition 3 shows however that access price discrim-
ination may also be welfare enhancing by leading to lower interconnection fees and by ensuring
that the IXC will eventually interconnect with both LECs. The reason why price discrimination
leads to a lower reciprocal access fee, a, is that if the LECs would try to set a high a as in the no
discrimination case, the IXC would set a prohibitively high fee on transit calls and would thereby
commit not to send or receive such calls. This lowers the disagreement payo¤s of the two LECs
and would force them to accept lower interconnection fees.
5 The LECs make o¤ers
Thus far, we have assumed that the IXC has all the bargaining power vis-a-vis the two LECs and
can make them take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. In this section we examine the opposite polar case in
which the LECs have all the bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC.
Let (r1; br1) and (r2; br2) be the contracts that the two LECs o¤er the IXC, where ri is
the per-call interconnection fee that LEC i demands in case each LEC receives its long-distance
calls directly from the IXC, and bri is the per-call interconnection fee if the IXC interconnects
exclusively with LEC i. We assume that the LECs do not price discriminate between direct and
transited calls.14 The IXC can either accept or reject each o¤er. If it accepts both o¤ers, its total
expenditure on interconnection fees is (1 +m) (Q1r1 +Q2r2), while if it interconnects only with
13Alternatively, if a LEC can unilaterally refuse to transit calls, then the IXC can o¤er a price of 0 on such calls in
which case, it will not pay a LEC to transit calls to and from a rival LEC and the same outcome will emerge.
14 In a previous version of this paper we showed that when the LECs have all the bargaining power vis-a-vis the
IXC, the LECs ability to price discriminate between direct and transited long-distance calls is immaterial in the sense
that the results do not change in the presence of price discrimination.
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LEC i, its total expenditure is (1 +m) (Q1 +Q2) bri. Recalling that ° ´ Q1Q1+Q2 , it follows that the
IXC will interconnect with both LECs if and only if
°r1 + (1¡ °) r2 · min fbr1; br2g : (12)
If (12) fails, the IXC will interconnect exclusively with the LEC that demands the minimum betweenbr1 and br2. If br1 = br2, the IXC will pick one of the two LECs at random and will interconnect
exclusively with that LEC. Consequently, LEC i’s expected pro…t is
¼i =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
Qi(ri ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi(ri ¡ c¡ co); if (12) holds;
Qi(bri ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi(bri ¡ c¡ co)
+Qj(bri ¡ a¡ c) +mQj(bri + a¡ c); if (12) fails and bri < brj;
Qi(bri¡c¡ct)+mQi(bri¡c¡co)+Qj(bri¡a¡c)+mQj(bri+a¡c)
2 ; if (12) fails and brj = bri;
Qi(a¡ c¡ ct)¡mQi(a+ c+ co); if (12) fails and bri > brj:
(13)
Using (13) we now characterize the equilibrium o¤ers of the two LECs and the IXC’s
response.
Proposition 4: (The interconnection fees when the LECs make o¤ers to the IXC) Suppose that
the LECs can simultaneously make o¤ers to the IXC. Then the equilibrium o¤ers, (r¤1; br¤1) and
(r¤2; br¤2) will be such that ³1¡m1+m´a · r¤1 · ³1¡m1+m´ a + c, ³1¡m1+m´ a · r¤2 · ³1¡m1+m´a + c, andbr¤1 = br¤2 = °r¤1 + (1¡ °) r¤2. The IXC will accept both o¤ers and will transfer long-distance calls
directly to each LEC. The resulting equilibrium will therefore be e¢cient.
Proof: First note that in equilibrium, (12) must hold with equality, otherwise each LEC i can
make more money by raising ri slightly. Second, note that (12) cannot fail: if it does and bri < brj ,
then LEC i can make more money by raising bri slightly. If (12) fails and br1 = br2, then LEC i’s
expected pro…t is given by the expression in the third line of (13). If this expression falls short of
the expression in the fourth line of (13), it pays LEC i to raise bri. If the expression in the third
line of (13) is at least as large as that in the fourth line of (13), then it pays LEC i to lower bri
slightly. Hence, in equilibrium, (12) must hold with equality and LEC i’s pro…t is given by the
expression in the top line in (13).
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Since (12) holds with equality, we will restrict attention to cases in which br¤1 = br¤2 = br¤,
where (12) implies that br¤ = °r¤1 + (1¡ °) r¤2. We do so because given r1 and r2, there exists a
continuum of equilibria that di¤er only with respect to the value of max fbr1; br2g. But since all of
these equilibria are payo¤ equivalent, it is natural to focus on symmetric cases in which br1 = br2 = br.
Now, note that raising ri and bri will violate (12); since bri will exceed br¤; the IXC will interconnect
exclusively with LEC j so LEC i’s pro…t will become Qi(a¡ c¡ ct)¡mQi(a+ c+ co). To ensure
that this deviation is unpro…table, it must be that in equilibrium,
Qi(r
¤
i ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi(r¤i ¡ c¡ co) ¸ Qi(a¡ c¡ ct)¡mQi(a+ c+ co); i = 1; 2;
or equivalently, r¤1 ¸
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a and r¤2 ¸
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a. Likewise, lowering bri slightly will violate (12)
and induce the IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC i; in which case its pro…t will be almost
Qi(br¤ ¡ c¡ ct) +Qj(br¤ ¡ a¡ c): To ensure that this deviation is unpro…table, it must be that in
equilibrium
Qi (r
¤
i ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi (r¤i ¡ c¡ co)
¸ Qi (br¤ ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi (br¤ ¡ c¡ co) +Qj (br¤ ¡ a¡ c) +mQj (br¤ + a¡ c) (14)
= Qi (r
¤
i ¡ c¡ ct) +mQi (r¤i ¡ c¡ co) +Qj
¡
r¤j ¡ a¡ c
¢
+mQj
¡
r¤j + a¡ c
¢
;
where the last equality follows because (12) holds with equality. Inequality (14) requires that
r¤j ·
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a+ c; i = 1; 2.
We complete the proof by showing that any triplet (r¤1; r¤2; br¤) such that ³1¡m1+m´a · r¤1 ·³
1¡m
1+m
´
a+ c,
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a · r¤2 ·
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a+ c, and br¤ = °r¤1 + (1¡ °) r¤2 can be an equilibrium. In
equilibrium, LEC i’s pro…t is given by the top line of (14). Fixing LEC j’s o¤er, let’s consider
possible deviations for LEC i. Raising both ri and bri will induce the IXC to interconnect exclusively
with LEC j, so LEC i’s pro…t will be by the fourth line in (13); since r¤i ¸
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a, such a
deviation does not increase LEC i’s pro…t. Raising ri while lowering bri below br¤ will induce the
IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC i. The resulting pro…t of LEC i will be less than the
expression in the middle line of (14) and hence is unpro…table. Raising ri while keeping bri = br¤
will induce the LEC to pick one of the LECs at random and interconnect exclusively with that
LEC. The resulting expected pro…t of LEC i is half of the expression in the middle line of (14),
and hence is unpro…table as well. Hence, it never pays LEC i to change ri: But if ri is constant,
then raising bri above br¤ does not a¤ect the equilibrium, while lowering bri below br¤ will induce
the IXC to interconnect exclusively with LEC i, so LEC i’s pro…t will be given once again by the
expression in the middle line of (14). ¥
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Comparing Propositions 1 and 4 reveals that the LECs bene…t when they have all the
bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC in the sense that they end up receiving higher interconnection
fees from the IXC: when the IXC has all the bargaining power, the interconnection fees are at
most
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a; while if the two LECs have the bargaining power, the interconnection fees are at
least
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a. Moreover, Proposition 4 shows that when the LECs have all the bargaining power,
the IXC will e¢ciently interconnect directly with both LECs implying that the potential ex post
ine¢ciency identi…ed in Corollary 1 is completely eliminated.
Proposition 4 has several interesting implications. First, the interconnection fees depend
only on the reciprocal access fee, a, the cost of transmission, c, and the ratio of outbound to inbound
tra¢c,m, but are independent of the shares of the two LECs in the long-distance tra¢c, ° and 1¡°,
and the costs of call termination, ct, and call origination, co. The fact that the interconnection
fees are independent of the LECs’ costs of originating and terminating long-distance calls is akin
to the ”o¤-net-cost pricing principle” of La¤ont et al. (2003). According to this principle, internet
backbones set their retail price as if their connections were entirely o¤-net. Here the relevant prices
are not retail prices but rather interconnection fees that the IXC pays; nonetheless, these fees are
set as if all tra¢c was transited to the rival LEC (i.e., on the basis of the o¤-net costs, c+
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a).
Second, the equilibrium payo¤ of each LEC i is given by the top line of (14) with
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a ·
r¤i ·
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a+ c: Hence, as in the case where the IXC makes o¤ers, the LECs can strategically
use a as a way to boost their pro…ts at the IXC’s expense. However, unlike in the case where the
IXC makes o¤ers, here there is no con‡ict of interest between the two LECs: both wish to raise jaj
as much as possible.15
Corollary 5: (The LECs’ preferences over the reciprocal access fee when they make o¤ers to the
IXC) If the two LECs can simultaneously make o¤ers to the IXC, then they will both prefer to raise
jaj as much as possible.
Third, and again unlike the case where the IXC makes o¤ers, now the two LECs mutually
prefer to commit not to transit calls to and from one another. Absent transit, each LEC becomes a
monopolist with respect to calls that originate and terminate at its own network and can charge the
IXC appropriate interconnection fees.16 Transit introduces competition between the two LECs and
hence weakens their bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC. By contrast, when the IXC makes o¤ers,
15Again, if the demand for long-distance calls is price elastic, the two LECs will wish to raise a only up to a certain
point.
16Carter and Wright (1999) argue that if the LECs compete with one another and use two-part tari¤s, they will
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transit boosts the LECs bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC since it allows them, when m 6= 1, to
get a revenue of at least
³
1¡m
1+m
´
a on transited calls. Note, however, that so long as transit can be
done on a unilateral basis (i.e., it does not require the mutual consent of both LECs), then there
does not exist an equilibrium in which both LECs refuse to transit calls to one another. To see
why, suppose otherwise and suppose that the monopoly price of LEC i is equal to or below the
monopoly price of LEC j. Then, LEC i would o¤er the IXC an exclusive interconnection at a
price which is slightly below the monopoly price of LEC j. The IXC will accept the o¤er (this
arrangement lowers the IXC’s cost of sending and receiving long-distance calls to and from LEC
j), thus upsetting the putative equilibrium. Consequently,
Corollary 6: (Voluntary transit) Transit makes both LECs worse o¤ relative to the case where
they can refuse to transit long-distance calls. However, absent a binding agreement that prohibits
transit, the LECs will be unable to commit not to transit calls to and from one another.
Finally, Proposition 4 implies that if the LECs are required to interconnect with each
other at no charge (a = 0) or if the long-distance calling pattern is balanced (m = 1), then the
equilibrium will be such that r¤ = br¤ 2 [0; c]. Consequently, both LECs will at best recover their
cost of transmission, c, but not their costs of call termination, ct, or call origination, co. This result
is striking since it implies that the ability to transit calls via a competing LEC at no charge (when
m = 0 the access charges cancel out so the situation is similar to that under a = 0) induces both
LECs to interconnect with the IXC at below-cost rates, even though the LEC-IXC interconnection
is not regulated and the LECs have all of the bargaining power vis-a-vis the IXC.17
6 Conclusion
While a variety of network industries around the world continue to open up to competition, with
an accompanying hope for reducing regulatory intervention, the terms under which networks grant
access to their customer base is still, for the most part, under strict regulation. This access
use their pro…ts from long-distance access charges as a way to subsidize their respective retail …xed line charges in an
attempt to increase their respective market shares and thereby boost their pro…ts from long-distance access charges.
This would lead to an escalation of the long-distance access fees (which in their model are set by the LECs) until the
long-distance market will vanish.
17 It should be stressed however that the LECs need not lose money on long-distance calls as they may be able to
recover the remaining cost of call origination and termination from their own customers. Indeed, this is one of the
main justi…cations for mandating ”bill and keep” regimes.
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regulation re‡ects the concern of regulators that despite competition between networks, access to
their customer-base remains a bottleneck monopoly. In this paper, we explored the role that
competitive transit can play in this context. We showed that there is a wide set of cases in which
competitive transit could justify complete deregulation of access to a network’s customer base.
Our analysis applies to the case of two-way access problems involving interconnected LECs
and IXCs as well as to one-way access problems that arise when an ISP seeks access to a LEC
or cable carrier’s customer base, or an electricity generator or retailer seeks access to a utility’s
infrastructure. A closely related issue is the termination charges that cellular carriers charge other
carriers (wireline or cellular) for calling their subscribers. This issue has been the subject of an
ongoing public and regulatory debate in many countries.18 The general feeling is that, absent
access price regulation, cellular carriers will set excessively high termination charges since these
charges are not borne by their own subscribers, and hence are not subject to competitive pressures.
Our results suggest that competitive transit could alleviate this problem as well: if the cellular
carrier is interconnected with another network (wireline or cellular), the caller’s network could
access the cellular carrier’s subscribers via this other network. Unlike in our model, however, the
cellular carrier pays access fees to other networks for calls that originate in its network, whereas
in our model, the LECs always receive access fees from the IXC irrespective of whether the calls
have originated or were terminated in their own networks. It would therefore be interesting to
examine in future research how competitive transit a¤ects the multilateral access fees in such an
environment.
18For some recent discussion, see for example Anthony Cox, ”Mobile termination rates to remain …xed bugbear
under new regime,” Telecom Markets, July 29, 2003 (discussing proposed cost-based regulation of cellular call ter-
mination in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK); ”USTR Telecom Trade Review Stresses
Wireless, EU Concerns,” Washington Telecom Newswire, April 3, 2002, Today’s News (emphasizing excessive cellular
termination rates in the European Union and Japan); Simon Hayes, ”Canberra rejects move on high wholesale prices,”
The Australian, August 19, 2003, p. 26 (discussing the regulatory debate over excessive cellular termination rates in
Australia); and ”Watchdog can’t force call rates cut,” Het Financieele Dagblad, January 24, 2003, p. 8 (discussing
the regulatory debate over excessive termination charges to cellular networks in Germany.
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